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521 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 
Jennifer L. Erickson* 
ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW DURING THE GREAT WAR (CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 
368. HARDCOVER $ 45.00. 
Does international law matter? This is certainly not a new question, but Isabel V. 
Hull’s A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War 
gives it fresh historical perspective by examining the role of international law in World 
War I.1 This approach also distinguishes A Scrap of Paper from an array of other historical 
accounts and biographies that have been published on the occasion of the centenary of the 
start of the war. Hull provides a detailed account of the ways in which international law 
shaped debates within and between major belligerents during the war. She shows that 
Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Germany, engaged in in-depth discussions 
about what was and was not permissible under international law in deciding how to ap-
proach seven key issues during the war, including neutrality and land warfare, occupation 
and the treatment of civilians, blockade, the use of new weapons in conflict, and the use 
of reprisals. 
In doing so, Hull also seeks to combat prevalent realist views in American interna-
tional relations (IR), which argue that material power and interest, not law, drive state 
behavior.2 She argues that Germany’s post-war campaign to redirect international atten-
tion from the conduct of the war to its outbreak has erased the role of international law 
from historical and contemporary conversations about the war.3 Germany’s manufactured 
“forgetting,” in turn, has shaped American IR and its realist core. As German scholars 
came to the United States after 1945, they brought with them realpolitik theories rooted in 
                                                          
* White Family Sesquicentennial Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston 
College. I am grateful to Tim Crawford, Jennifer Dixon, and Ken Kersch for their helpful comments and insights 
in preparing this article. 
 1. ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE GREAT 
WAR (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News about Compliance 
Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 PROC. ANN. 
MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 265 (2002); HANS J.  MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973). 
 3. HULL, supra note 1, at 3-14. 
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power just as the field was beginning to harden and professionalize.4 As a result, Hull 
charges, the field has tended to underestimate or even ignore the role of international law 
in World War I, and in war and world politics in general.5 
Hull presents a unique account of the war through the lens of international law, wor-
thy of the attention of historians, lawyers, and political scientists alike. She is convincing 
in her efforts to show that policymakers in belligerent states engaged in detailed debates 
over the interpretation of international law and its consequences. This finding will resonate 
with many mainstream IR scholars, who would in fact agree with Hull’s general claim that 
law can matter in international politics and war.6 Contemporary IR theories are diverse in 
their perspectives on states’ commitment to and compliance with international law.7 How-
ever, the discrepancies Hull describes between Great Britain and France’s more consistent 
                                                          
 4. See Miles Kahler, Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945, in NEW 
THINKING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (1997). One of these foundational German realist scholars 
was Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau had originally been a scholar of international law in Germany and Switzer-
land. It was not World War I, however, that turned him away from international law and into a scholar of political 
science and power politics, but rather Nazism. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peace and War, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012). 
 5. HULL, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
 6. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS (2014); Adam Bower, Arguing with Law: Strategic Legal Argumentation, US Diplomacy and Debates 
Over the International Criminal Court, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 337, 337 (2015); JANINA DILL, LEGITIMATE 
TARGETS? SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND US BOMBING (2014); Renée de Nevers, The Ge-
neva Conventions and New Wars, 121 POL. SCI. Q. 369 (2006); JENNIFER L. ERICKSON, DANGEROUS TRADE: 
ARMS EXPORTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION (2015); MATTHEW A. EVANGELISTA, 
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2008); Tanisha M. Fazal, The Demise of Peace Treaties in Interstate 
War, 67 INT’L ORG. 695 (2013); Martha Finnemore, Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red 
Cross and the Restraint of Violence, in JOHN BOLL & GEORGE M. THOMAS, CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: 
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (1999); Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. 
Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 743 (2001); 
COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE 
PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE (2014); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 
379 (1999); Judith G. Kelley & Jon C.W. Pevehouse, An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior, 59  
INT’L STUD. Q. 531 (2015); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 487 (1997); Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice 
in Latin America, 54 INT’L ORG. 633, 633 (2000); THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Christian Reus-
Smit ed., 2004); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819 (2000); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Thomas W. Smith, The New Law of War: 
Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructure Violence, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 355 (2002). 
 7. For IR realists, the anarchic nature of the international system compels rational, self-interested states to 
rely on their material power capabilities to protect their security and survival. International law only “matters” 
when states choose to make it matter—that is, when it happens to serve their material interests or when they are 
coerced to comply by other, more powerful states. Without any world government to enforce it, it plays little 
meaningful part. In contrast, for neoliberal institutionalists, reciprocity and the “shadow of the future” can moti-
vate compliance from self-interested states seeking material gains from cooperation; states will avoid cooperating 
with a state with a track record of violating their international commitments. For other IR liberals, democracies’ 
experience of the rule of law in domestic politics spills over into respect for law in international politics. Still 
others emphasize the ability of domestic institutions to enforce international law. Finally, constructivist IR schol-
ars expand explanations for compliance to non-material factors, including legitimacy, identity, the internalization 
of laws and social norms, and a sense of legal or normative obligation. Here, compliance is not simply the result 
of a “logic of consequences” cost-benefit calculation conducted by rational states, but also the “logic of appro-
priateness,” in which states embedded in an international social structure comply because they feel they ought to 
comply (and wish to avoid the social opprobrium of noncompliance). For a very succinct overview of the three 
major IR theoretical paradigms and others, see generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Princi-
pal Theories, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011) 
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attention to the law and Germany’s frequent decisions to set aside, flout, or reinterpret it 
suggest that the importance of law to states and their policymakers varies. A Scrap of Paper 
shows that international law “matters” but inconsistently and often instrumentally. The 
book therefore raises persistent and nuanced interdisciplinary puzzles about how, when, 
and why international law matters. Hull introduces plausible answers linked to regime 
type, civil-military relations, public opinion, and international reputation. However, if in-
ternational law serves the interests of the existing hegemon rather than the rising power, 
realists would equally expect Great Britain to uphold it and Germany to set it aside in order 
to gain a military edge. This is a limitation of the cases, not of Hull’s research. Neverthe-
less, she cannot satisfactorily eliminate, as she sets out to do, realist explanations that look 
to power and a “coincidence of interest” to understand when and why states follow inter-
national law.8 Rather, it is Hull’s findings about the sources of compliance and noncom-
pliance that provide the most complex and interesting insights into contemporary debates 
about the relationship between law and interest in international politics. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD WAR I 
International law rarely factors into discussions about World War I.9 Indeed, World 
War I ushered in a sense of public disillusionment with war and has been characterized as 
a failure of prewar international law and cooperation.10 In the field of international rela-
tions, the war is instead commonly told as a story of power politics, alliance competition, 
and national interest. Hull’s contribution is therefore a welcome one. As she notes, “[i]nter-
national law was so central to how contemporaries interpreted the war because law was a 
linchpin and guarantee of the post-Napoleonic European state system that the war seemed 
to be destroying.”11 The years leading up to the war witnessed an outpouring of diplomatic 
efforts by the major powers to create laws and norms regulating the conduct of war. Alt-
hough ratification success varied, those efforts included the 1856 Declaration of Paris 
abolishing privateering; the 1864 and 1906 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of sick 
and wounded soldiers and sailors; the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration prohibiting the use 
of explosive projectiles in war; the 1874 Brussels Declaration on the laws and customs of 
war; the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the conduct of war and the settlement of 
interstate disputes; and the 1909 Declaration of London (DoL) on the laws of naval war. 
These agreements did not simply disappear at the start of the war, as Hull shows. In 
case after case, she documents discussions between politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, 
                                                          
https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf. 
 8. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 27. 
 9. As an exception, see Hatsue Shinohara, International Law and World War I, 38 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 880 
(2014). Interested readers should also look forward to Peter Holquist’s current book project, BY RIGHT OF WAR: 
IMPERIAL RUSSIA AND THE DISCIPLINE AND PRACTICE OF THE “LAWS OF WAR” (1868-1917) (unpublished man-
uscript). 
 10. EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919-1939 ix-x (1939); PAUL FUSSELL, THE 
GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY (1975); Peter Krüger, From the Paris Peace Treaties to the End of the 
Second World War, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 679 (Bardo Fass-
bender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); STUART ROCHESTER, AMERICAN LIBERAL DISILLUSIONMENT IN THE WAKE 
OF WORLD WAR I (1977); Stephen van Evera, Why Cooperation Failed in 1914, 38 WORLD POL. 80 (1985). 
 11. HULL, supra note 1, at 2. 
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lawyers, and military officers that weighed the contents and interpretation of these agree-
ments and other laws and customs in making key decisions over the course of the war. 
These were often internal discussions, moreover, out of public view, indicating that con-
cern for law was more than just a show for external audiences. Hull does not contend that 
policymakers always chose to go with the law, nor does she ignore the actual or perceived 
ambiguity in the law. Rather, she takes great care to understand points of contention within 
and between states, which in turn reveal the substantive attention law received in decision-
making during the war. Hull’s analysis makes clear that international law was an accepted 
centerpiece of conversation, not an afterthought. 
Moreover, the cases show that custom and norms embodied in law, not only the 
material enforcement potential of formal treaty law, can shape states’ decision-making. 
Hull also details policymakers’ debates over the interpretation of agreements that did not 
go into effect or were of uncertain legal status, like the DoL. When the DoL was negoti-
ated, according to Elihu Root, the expectation was that the ten great naval powers would 
agree on a code of naval warfare, “substitut[ing] uniformity and certainty for the diversity 
and obscurity from which international relations have too long suffered.”12 Yet the failure 
of the British House of Lords to ratify the DoL—due to domestic debates unrelated to the 
Declaration13—meant that it never went into effect. Hull observes that “[t]he DoL was . . . 
more advantageous to Britain as a neutral power than as a belligerent.”14 Even so, the 
admiralty and Foreign Office debated and sought to adapt to its rules (albeit with adapta-
tions of its own15), and it substantively shaped debates until mid-1916 on whether and how 
to blockade Germany. 
Hull is more critical of Germany’s (more frequent) attempts to evade and interpret 
international law to suit its interests. Yet even Germany, she notes, was not wholly without 
concern for international law during the war. For example, the first German submarine 
attacks on enemy merchant vessels in 1914 were unplanned but carried out according to 
international law for surface ships. In addition, the decision to initiate unrestricted subma-
rine warfare (USW) as state policy16 was one of Germany’s few fully coordinated deci-
sions during the war—and perhaps its most controversial.17 Chief of the high seas fleet 
Admiral von Ingenohl initially “refused on legal and humanitarian grounds to forward 
[the] . . . suggestion” to his superiors, relenting a week later under pressure from the naval 
                                                          
 12. Elihu Root, The Real Significance of the Declaration of London, 6 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 589 (1912). 
 13. Christopher Martin, The Declaration of London: A Matter of Operational Capability, 82 HIST. RES. 731, 
755 (2009). 
 14. HULL, supra note 1, at 144. 
 15. Id. at 148, 158-61. 
 16. Unrestricted submarine warfare refers to the use of submarines in violation of international “prize” or 
“cruiser” rules governing how military ships may attack merchant vessels. These rules were formalized in the 
Hague Conventions and dictate that merchant vessels may not be sunk without warning. Both enemy and neutral 
merchant vessels must stop if confronted by a belligerent ship, which must be allowed to inspect the vessel for 
contraband (the rules also specify what constituted contraband). It is permissible to sink ships carrying contra-
band if it is not feasible to take the ship as a prize to the belligerent’s home port. The crews of captured ships 
must be removed to safety before being sunk. These rules were devised prior to the development of submarines 
as offensive weapons. Submarines were neither large enough to take additional people from an attacked vessel 
on board, nor sufficiently staffed or typically near enough to home ports to take captured ships as a prize. 
 17. HULL, supra note 1, at 211. 
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officer corps.18 At that point, the chancellor and members of the military and foreign office 
debated what international law did and did not allow, the ability to apply international law 
to new weapons like the submarine, and how neutral states might react. The government 
also sought legal cover, citing British legal violations as justification for reprisals. That 
approach, in turn, introduced the “flag ruse” and merchant vessel resistance as major points 
of contention in international law before (and after) the war. Beyond this, however, Hull 
observes that “[German] legal considerations were absent, or rather only present in their 
concern for the neutrals’ reaction.”19 
Yet in this case, Hull is perhaps too quick to assume that the new submarine vessels 
had the capacity to follow existing international rules for surface ships regularly and safely. 
She asserts that the “most successful method” of using submarines was to use them “(al-
most) legally.”20 However, this conflates the technical capabilities of weapons with their 
political capabilities. As she shows, Germany arguably could have met its political goals 
by restricting submarine warfare, especially in its relations with the United States.21 Many 
submarine experts nevertheless contend that World War I demonstrated that it was unre-
alistic to apply cruiser rules to submarines given their technical capabilities and limita-
tions.22 This was not simply a matter of military advantage—although clearly cruiser rules 
took away the submarine’s key advantage of surprise—but also of the compromised safety 
of the vessels and their crews, which became more vulnerable to gunfire and ramming by 
armed merchant ships when they surfaced to carry out cruiser rule requirements. Thus, 
Germany might have been better off in its larger war aims by avoiding USW—this, as 
noted, has been a matter of debate—but whether its claims about the inability to use sub-
marines in accordance with international law was just for show or also rooted in practical 
limitations of the weapons technology is less straightforward than Hull suggests. 
Overall, therefore, Hull succeeds in her first goal to demonstrate that international 
law was the subject of regular and significant debate among three of the major belligerents 
during World War I. In this sense, international law “mattered.” Even so, the belligerents 
at times ignored international law, followed it inconsistently, or strategically manipulated 
it to meet other political or military ends. In the sense of shaping states’ behavior, there-
                                                          
 18. Id. at 216. 
 19. Id. at 217. 
 20. Id. at 266. 
 21. Scholars debate how close USW brought Germany to victory in the war. By bringing the U.S. into the 
war, Germany’s policy certainly hastened its own demise, and there are questions about whether it ever could 
have achieved its goals by relying on USW. See Avner Offer, Bounded Rationality in Action: The German Sub-
marine Campaign, 1915-18, in THE ECONOMICS OF RATIONALITY 179 (1993). However, others have argued that 
Germany’s submarines “[conducted] such a war of attrition on merchant shipping as to threaten the very existence 
of nations dependent upon seaborne trade,” and Churchill later asserted that the German submarine campaign 
almost lost the war for Britain. See Ernest Andrade, Jr., Submarine Policy in the United States Navy, 35 MIL. 
AFF. 50 (1971); BERNARD BRODIE, SEA POWER IN THE MACHINE AGE 332 (1944). 
 22. See BRODIE, supra note 21; Jane Gilliland, Submarines and Targets: Suggestions for New Codified Rules 
of Submarine Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 975 (1985); PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 
(1994); Howard S. Levie, Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol, 65 NAVAL WAR 
C. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 27 (1993); John N. Petrie, The Change, 29 McNair Papers (1995); H.G. Rickover, Inter-
national Law and the Submarine, 61 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 1213 (1935); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1959); V.E. TARRANT, THE U-BOAT OFFENSIVE 1914-1945 (1989). 
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fore, international law did not always “matter.” Hull’s cases show that while states con-
sistently debated the law, their compliance (i.e., their implementation of the law in prac-
tice) was mixed. For realists, this is a key point. Rhetoric can mask motives, realists insist, 
and morality is the product of the powerful.23 Consequently, only states’ action can be 
assessed.24 Thus, for international law to “matter” in realism, it must affect states’ actions 
or practice, not only their debates and discussions. Whether or not one agrees with realists 
on this count is beside the point here. For Hull to be most convincing in her second goal 
to counter realist claims about international law, she needs to do more to explore the com-
pliance side of the story, examining why states adhered to and ignored international law 
on the battlefield and in occupied zones in practice. 
Realism expects, first, that states will follow international law only when it advances 
their interests and, second, that international law reflects the interests of the relatively most 
powerful state or states in the system. When it comes to accounting for states’ noncompli-
ance, Hull therefore may not be as far apart from realism as she sets out to be. First, as 
realists would expect, her cases show the major belligerents at times interpreting or ignor-
ing the law according to their own political or military interests. States are flexible about 
international law in A Scrap of Paper, and their decisions about law are often instrumental, 
made in accordance with their perceived interests in the war.25 For example, in planning 
to blockade Germany, Great Britain assessed how to rationalize and modify international 
law in strategically useful ways, and engaged in active diplomatic efforts to appease neu-
tral states and businesses and legitimate its measures.26 Indeed, Hull ultimately attributes 
British success in gaining neutral acquiescence to its blockade “to the nature of its govern-
ment and the breadth and depth of its power.”27 In the submarine case, she makes the 
uncontroversial observation that “the main impetus to throw over international law was 
Germany’s own weakness as a belligerent.”28 It did not have the military capacity to op-
erate successfully within the constraints of law. Germany too was keen to appease neutrals 
but lacked the resources to do so relative to Britain. Law thus became a tool for states to 
achieve military and political goals, most successfully used when coupled with greater 
capabilities and resources. 
Second, that Germany much more readily violated international agreements than 
Great Britain would come as no surprise to realists: existing laws serve hegemonic inter-
ests, not the interests of the rising power. In the century before the war, hegemonic Great 
Britain had assumed a position as the enforcer of international law and used it as a means 
to protect its imperial interests.29 International laws and their interpretation, including the 
                                                          
 23. CARR, supra note 10, at 64; MORGENTHAU, supra note 2, at 6. 
 24. MORGENTHAU, supra note 2, at 6. 
 25. John Fabian Witt explores similar themes in his examination of international law in nineteenth century 
US warfare. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012). 
 26. HULL, supra note 1, at 140-210. 
 27. Id. at 181. 
 28. Id. at 112, 217, 223. 
 29. Nicoletta F. Gullace, Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law 
during the First World War, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 714, 737 (1997); Michelle Tusan, “Crimes against Humanity”: 
Human Rights, the British Empire, and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide, 119 AM. HIST. 
REV. 47, 51 (2014). 
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Hague Conventions, were themselves the product of politics and power. Hull points out 
that Germany had long disagreed with other states on the content of international law30 
and saw noncompliance as essential to achieve victory and upend the existing system in 
favor of its own.31 This suggests ambivalence and opposition to an existing system of law, 
rather than necessarily to law in general. Indeed, systems of international law and incen-
tives for compliance are not static, as James Whitman shows, but rather have changed with 
time and modes of warfare.32 Eschewing one need not indicate distaste for all. Although 
Hull acknowledges that law reflects the interests of the powerful, she counters that it also 
limits the powerful.33 Yet her cases generally suggest that powerful states could and did 
work around international law when needed. 
In the end, if states follow international law when their interests and the law coin-
cide, realist explanations for compliance at the very least remain plausible.34 Hull’s cases 
make it difficult to empirically untangle interests or laws as independent forces driving 
state behavior. Hull would, for instance, need Germany to comply despite its military in-
terests. Expanding her (albeit already expansive) study to include other belligerents such 
as the Ottoman Empire on the side of Germany35 or Russia, an autocracy with a hand in 
creating nineteenth century international law,36 might have given Hull more empirical lev-
erage to move away from realism. However, if, as she also contends, international law 
protects national interests37 and German noncompliance is a product of its weakness, then 
she may not undermine realist ideas so much as support them. 
II. WHEN AND WHY DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTER? 
Although Hull seeks primarily to bring international law back into the story of World 
War I, it is in explaining variation in when and why it matters that her account moves 
furthest away from realism. Military advantage and power considerations may encourage 
or necessitate noncompliance, but her picture of national interest as it motivates compli-
ance is more complex. In particular, she highlights regime type, linked to civil-military 
relations, public opinion, and states’ concern for international reputation, in prompting 
compliance with international law. Hull is less systematic in exploring these motives. In 
fairness, she has not explicitly set out to do so. Nevertheless, her findings offer important 
insights into ongoing debates on what generates compliance with international law in the 
                                                          
 30. HULL, supra note 1, at 58. 
 31. Id. at 268. 
 32. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE: THE LAW OF VICTORY AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
WAR (2012). 
 33. HULL, supra note 1, at 320. 
 34. See Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note 2, at 380; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2. 
 35. MUSTAFA AKSAKAL, THE OTTOMAN ROAD TO WAR IN 1914: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 21-22, 78 (2008). Aksakal touches on Ottoman views of international law, suggesting a rejection 
of international law as subject to double standards and unable to meet the needs of Ottoman security interests. 
Id. 
 36. On Imperial Russia and international law, see HOLQUIST, supra note 9; Peter Holquist, The Russian Em-
pire as a “Civilized State”: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial Russia, 1874-1878, NAT’L 
COUNCIL EURASIAN & E. EUR. (2006); Peter Holquist, “Crimes against Humanity”: Genealogy of a Concept 
(1815-1945) (unpublished manuscript). 
 37. HULL, supra note 1, at 199. 
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absence of a world government to enforce it. 
Hull contrasts Great Britain’s stronger interest in compliance with the less compliant 
Wilhelmine Germany, linking their differences broadly to their regime types. First, dem-
ocratic Great Britain has stronger civilian control of government decision-making, which 
pushes it to be more attentive to diplomacy and international law. Cabinet oversight and 
its legal and diplomatic expertise feature as important components of British success in 
curbing “military proclivities” and bringing about neutral support for its policies.38 Alt-
hough categorizing Germany’s regime type in this period is especially complex,39 Hull 
attributes its elevation of “military necessity” over international law to its centralized de-
cision-making apparatus and the military’s dominant role in it.40 She notes that although 
the Auswärtiges Amt (foreign office) was more cautious and attentive to law, it lost lever-
age over the military early on in the war.41 Civilian leaders in Germany allowed military 
leaders to define national security and make war plans accordingly, “subordinat[ing] their 
misgivings to military expertise.”42 This regime-centric argument accords with liberal ac-
counts of international law, in which democracies are more attentive to international law 
because of their experience with the domestic rule of law, constitutionalism, and cosmo-
politanism.43 
Second, Hull emphasizes that public opinion and public accountability helped push 
Great Britain to greater compliance with international law. Democracy required public 
backing for Britain to act, while concern for public backlash in some cases kept it attentive 
to the constraints of international law.44 Policymakers were also aware that creating or 
violating international law meant convincing “public opinion”45 and, therefore, engaged 
in public campaigns and propaganda throughout the war. Absent the German case, this 
might make sense folded into regime type. However, Hull also shows that the German 
government faced public pressure. Except in the German case, public opinion fed pressures 
on the government to violate international law, as in the case of USW.46 This comparison 
serves to point out both that non-democratic governments may at times be subject to public 
pressures47 and that public accountability does not necessarily mean compliance with in-
ternational law. Governments may behave badly because of the public, not just in spite of 
it. What the public wants and why are complex issues. 
Finally, concern for international reputation frequently appears as a driving force 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 330, 178. 
 39. See Ido Oren, The Subjectivity of the “Democratic” Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Ger-
many, 20 INT’L SECURITY 147 (1995). 
 40. HULL, supra note 1, at 161, 224. 
 41. Id. at 287, 291. Others, however, assert that civilian control of the military was “relatively firm” until 
mid-1916. See MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY: THE CHANGING SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 76 (1999). 
 42. HULL, supra note 1, at 25. 
 43. See generally Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 
(1983); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). 
 44. HULL, supra note 1, at 36, 156, 151. 
 45. Id. at 152. 
 46. Id. at 241, 258, 261. 
 47. See Jessica L. Weeks, Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve, 62 INT’L ORG. 35 
(2008). 
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behind states’ compliance with international law. Hull argues that a state’s international 
reputation and its care for international law are inexorably intertwined.48 Although she 
less clearly accounts for why some states are more invested in their reputation than oth-
ers,49 Hull observes in several instances that Britain complied because it wanted its ap-
pearance to others to reflect how it saw itself, as a law-abiding “civilized” nation.50 More-
over, as a judgment of a state’s character and not simply the legality of its actions, the 
threat of international condemnation and revulsion may have constrained British action in 
some cases even where decisions might have been technically permissible under the law.51 
In contrast, Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality instantly ruined its reputation.52 
However, it seemed indifferent to its “uncivilized” image, which permitted it a simplified 
approach to international law.53 Its care for how neutral states would judge its actions was 
born of concern about the strategic consequences of their reactions, not of confirming their 
view of Germany’s self-image. Beyond the neutrals, Germany seems to exhibit little con-
cern for the more generic “world opinion.” Unlike Britain, which had learned from its 
international embarrassment in the Boer War, Germany seemed to have little awareness of 
how its actions would play in the eyes of the world or how to manipulate that sentiment.54 
By the end of the war, however, Hull mentions that the British saw Germany as sensitive 
to “outside opinion” and embarrassment.55 Rather than regime type, perhaps this then is a 
matter of lessons learned: States realize the value of a good reputation once they have lost 
it. 
Hull’s findings thus introduce important questions about why law matters and con-
tribute to ongoing debates in the study of international relations and international law about 
why states comply with international law.56 In many ways, these debates echo those in 
law and other social sciences about why people obey the law.57 Does law matter for the 
sake of law? What are incentives promote compliance with the law? Are some states more 
inclined to follow international law than others and, if so, why? Hull suggests on no un-
certain terms that this is the case but shows that it is perhaps not because of legal and 
normative obligation directly. Rather, complex combinations of national interest, identity, 
public opinion, and regime type intervene to explain states’ decisions to comply—and ig-
nore—international law. 
                                                          
 48. HULL, supra note 1, at 132, 290. 
 49. For a discussion on reputation as a social goal linking state identity and interests, see ERICKSON, supra 
note 6. 
 50. HULL, supra note 1, at 40, 151, 152, 200, 205-06, 237, 297. 
 51. Id. at 108, 297. 
 52. Id. at 41. 
 53. Id. at 132. 
 54. Gullace, supra note 29, at 734, 741 
 55. HULL, supra note 1, at 314. 
 56. In addition to sources in note 6, see also Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 
INT’L ORG. 175 (1993); Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra, note 2; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF 
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, note 2; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Andrew 
T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002); LOUIS HENKIN, 
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (1968); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 
2599 (1997); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75 (1998). 
 57. Tom R. Tyler, Understanding the Force of Law, 51 TULSA L. REV. 507 (2016). 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
A Scrap of Paper is an impressive and important account of World War I and should 
be read not only by historians, but also by scholars of international law, international rela-
tions, and political science. Hull shows that international law was not simply an occasional 
topic of conversation for policymakers in belligerent states, but was a pervasive point of 
concern, steeped in complex debates and strategic considerations. Hers is a nuanced pic-
ture of international law in action. Policymakers discuss interpretation, worry about public 
image, and weigh the material and social costs and benefits of compliance. Differences in 
domestic politics, institutions, national identity, and military and legal cultures spill over 
into state behavior in the international realm. The findings in A Scrap of Paper do not 
necessarily suggest that realism is wrong but rather that the causes of states’ compliance 
and noncompliance with international law are multiple and more complex perhaps than 
any one theory of international relations might allow. 
These lessons resonate strongly in contemporary world politics. As in the period 
around World War I, new defense technologies today challenge and potentially undermine 
accepted international laws and norms. Drones, cyber warfare, and lethal autonomous 
weapons systems all call attention to and question existing notions of responsibility and 
authority, what it means to make decisions in wartime, and even what it might mean to be 
at war. It is not yet clear how well current regimes can adapt to these new technologies, or 
how new rules will be hammered out and accepted by states with diverse power capabili-
ties and interests. As the international community faces the political, technical, legal, and 
military challenges of today, it may do well to learn from the evolution of international 
law and norms in the early twentieth century. Moreover, as China and Russia seek to flex 
their military muscle in their respective neighborhoods, the international community finds 
a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program, and the U.S. war on terror continues 
to come up against accepted legal discourse, it is clear that international law still “matters.” 
The questions will be how, why, and to what effect? 
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